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Adverse possession and informal purchasers 
UNA WOODS 
Lecturer, School of Law, University of Limerick 
I n England and Wales the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 dramatically reduced the scope of the doctrine of adverse possession in relation to registered land. 
The new adverse possession regime was justified in the report prececling the 2002 Act on 
the basis that it was more compatible with principles of title registration and struck a more 
appropriate balance between the landowner and squatter. 1 Although the 2002 Act confers 
the registe red owner of land with a power to veto most adverse possession applications, an 
application by a squatter who satisfies one of the three conditions set out in Schedule 6, 
paragraph 5, will succeed in spite of an objection by the registered owner. The Law 
Commission felt that in these situations, the balance of fairness lay with the squatter.2 Two 
of the conditions were designed to preserve the traditional effect of the doctrine for 
applicants who went into possession pursuant to an informal transfer. 3 The Law 
Commission noted [hat when a dealing takes place "off the register", the applicant does not 
represent a "land thief" and it would be unjust to allow the registered owner to veto the 
applicant'S registration.4 
The Law Commission neglected to indicate whether informal aansactions in relation to 
registered land were a widespread phenomenon in England and Wales or if the adverse 
possession procedure was frequently relied on in such circumstances to update the register.5 
Such information would have helped ::to contextualise the recognition of this exception to 
the veto system introduced by the 2002 Act. The purpose of this article is not, however, to 
second-guess the policy reasons behind the preferential treatment afforded to informal 
purchasers under the new adverse possession regime. Instead. it examines from a doctrinal 
perspective whether the possession of the in fo rmal purchasers envisaged by Schedule 6, 
paragraph 5, amoul1(S to adverse possession. 1 t illustrates that the poine at which a right of 
See Land &gistration Jor /ht 7iIJ8//(y-Firs/ Cm/my: A (onIJt)'all(ing reJ){)/lItion, Law Corom No 271 (200 1), at para. 14.4. 
Ibid .• at para 14.36. 
The third condition set au! in Sch 6, para. 5(4), of the Land Registration Act 2002 facil.itates the adjustment 
of boundaries between neighbours where onc neighbour adversely possessed the other's land reasonably 
believing it to be his or her own throughout the limilalion period. 
See LUld &J!islration for /Ix Twellty-Fint UlltUry: A coIIs,tllatit't dOOimml, Law Camm No 254 (1998), at pam. 10.14. 
Note that a culrure of informal land transactions and a high incidence of abandoned land forced New 
Zealand and certain Australian h:rritorics to re-introduce adverse possession for registered land, sec M M Park, 
The Effect 0/ AdlJtrst Pouwioll 011 Part 0/ a Regislfred Titlt l..Al/d Parcel (PhD thesis, Universiry of Melbourne. 
2003), ch. 6 (available at http://cprints.unimc!b.cdu.au/). 
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action accrues against a purchaser in possession pursuant to an oral or a written contract 
for sale is far from clear. A convincing argument could be made that such purchasers are 
not in adverse possession. Willie informal purchasers may be entitled to rely on the docrrinc 
o f proprietary eswppe16 or specific performance to have themselves registered as owners, 
the condicions set Out in Schedule 6, paragraph 5, of the 2002 Act were designed to offer 
them the more expedient remedy of an adverse possession application. For this option to 
be of benefit, however, it is essential CO eliminate any doubts about whether such informal 
purchasers are in adverse possession. The article concludes by reconunending the 
introduction of certain legislative amendments which would clarify when such purchasers 
become entitled to avail of this more expedient remedy. 
Schedule 6, paragraph 5(2), of the 2002 Act sets out the fIrst exception to the new veto 
regime governing adverse possession of registcred land. It provides that an applicant is 
entitled to be registered as the new owner of the estate if it would be unconscionable 
because of an eguity by estoppel for the registercd owner: to seck to dispossess the applicant 
and the circumstances are such that the app licant ought to be registered as the owner. In 
the discussions of this condition in the report which preceded the enactment of the 2002 
Act, the Law Commission gave an example of a purchaser who went inco possession of 
land pursuant to an oral contract for sale which failed to comply with reguircments set oU( 
in section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.7 The second 
exception is set out in paragraph 5(3) of Schedule 6 which reguires the applicant to prove 
an entitlement to be registered as owner "for some other reason". This condition was 
designed by dle Law Commission to cater for a purchaser who went into possession 
pursuant to an enforceable contract for sale.8 The informal purchasers envisaged by the 
Law Commission had paid the entire purchase price but were never registered as owners as 
the necessary steps to complete the transaction had not been taken. The purchaser 
envisaged by the flrst condition may be entitled to an eguity by estoppel, while the purchaser 
envisaged by the second condition holds an eguitable interest in the land. The Law 
Commission clearly assumed that the possession of such purchasers amounts to adverse 
possession which, if maintained for 10 years, extinguishes the title of the registered owner. 
However, the informal transactions just described fracrure the ownership of land so that 
legal and eguitable interests or equities become distinctly identifiable. Although adverse 
possession of land subject to fractional interests, such as the interests of co-owners or 
future owners, has always raised complications, the Law Commission did nOt discuss, in any 
detail, the controversy which has arisen over whether the possession of such purchasers can 
truly be described as adverse [0 the vendor or the implications of such an approach. This 
article begins with a discussion of the status of a purchaser in possession pursuant to an 
enforceable co ntract for sale who can, therefore, be described as the equitable owner. The 
position of a purchaser In possession pursuant to an oraJ,tcontract for sale who possesses 
an equity by estoppel is examined in the second part of the article. 
Although. as will be demonstrated in Pan 2 of this article, informal purchasers may face considerable difficult), 
in proving that thc circwns(ances give rise to an eswppd in the afterma th of the House of Lords' decision 
in }'wfllalls RiJwManage,mnf Udv Gbbt [20081 UKHL 55. 
Law Comm No 271, n. I above, at para 14.42. 
Ibid., at para. 14.43. The Law Commi~sion also gave an example of a claimant who is entitled to the land 
under the \\-""ill or intestacy o f the dcceased registered owne r. 
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Part 1 - Adverse possession by a purchaser entitled to equitable ownership 
The Law Commission reiterates the wisdom accepted by many modern land law textbooks 
that while the squatter- buyer who has paid the purchase price is a beneficiary under a bare 
trust and can be in adverse possession, a buyer who has not paid the whole of the purchase 
price will not be in adverse possession as his or her possession is attributable to the 
contract.9 T he authorities typically cited for this proposition are Bridges v Mees lO al)d Ifyde v 
Pearce. I I The difficulties with such an approach stem from the absence of any provision in 
the Limitation Act 1980 which explicitly sets out that the limitation period may run in 
favour of a purchaser and against a vendor \vho holds the property on constructive trust.12 
A few rules can be deduced from the provisions of the 1980 Act which deal with 
adverse possession in the context of trus t property. Although adverse possession by a 
stranger against a beneficiary is permitted,13 adverse possession by a trustee 14 or by another 
beneficiaryl5 in possession of the trust property against a beneficiary is prohibited. The 
courts have been forced to extrapolate from these provisions when deciding whether a 
purchaser can be in adverse possession against a vendor who holds the property on 
constructive trust. One ocher rule has influenced the reasoning of the courts on this issue 
and, although it no longer appears in the 1980 Act or the Limitation (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1989, it has been retained in the Irish Starute of Limitations 1957. It was originally 
set out in section 7 of the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 which provided that where a 
person was in possession of land as a (enant at will, the right of the owner to bring an action 
to recover such land would be deemed to have accrued at the determination of such 
tenancy or the expiration of one year after the commencement of (he tenancy. Section 7 
included a proviso which set out that a beneficiary would not be deemed to be a tenant at 
will to his trustee within the meaning of that section. 
It is important to understand the reasons for the inclusion of section 7 in the 1833 Act. 
Before the enactment of the 1833 Ac t, the Limitacion Act 1623 governed the limitation of 
actions and the courts supplemented it by developing technical rules to determine whether 
possession was adverse. These rules frequently made it difficult to identify when a right of 
action had accrued. For example, there had to be something in the namre of an «ouster" 
which would put the true owner on potice that time was running against him. Another rule 
treated the possession of a person with the consent of the owner as under a tenancy at will 
and incapable of amounting to adverse possession. Tn addition, once possession 
commenced lawfully it could never l?ecome adverse. The First Report rif Commissioners on Rea! 
PropertY published in 1829 criticised I some of these common law rules,16 in particular the 
Law Comm No. 271, n. 1 above, at para. 14.43. See C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon (eds), Megarry and [Vade: 
The Law of Real Property 6th edn (London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2000), at para. 21.040; K Gray and 
S r Gray, Elements of Land Law 4th edn (Oxford: our 2005), at para. 6.63. 
10 [19571 Ch 475. 
II [19821 I WLR 560. 
12 The same is true of the Limitation (Northern [reland) Order 1989 and the Irish Starute of Limitations 1957. 
13 S. 18(1) of the 1980 Act provides, subject to s. 21, the provisions of the Act shall apply to equitable interests 
in the land as they apply to legal estates. 
14 S. 21 (1) of the 1980 Act provides that no period of limitation shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under 
a trust to recover trust property from the trustee 
15 Sch. 1, para. 9, of the 1980 Act provides that where any land subject to a trust is in the possession of a person 
entitled to a beneficial interest in the land (not being a person solely or absolutely entitled to the land), no right 
of action shall be treated as accruing during that possession to the trustee or any other beneficiary. 
16 They commented that certain rules were of questionable expediency and greatly impaired the healing 
tendency of the Statutes of Limitation, at p. 47 . 
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rule which prevented possession which began rightfully from maturing into adverse 
possession. It concluded that a ftnding of adverse possession should be possible once the 
rightful estate of the party had been determined. 17 However, in the case of a tenancy, at will 
it was freguently difficult to determine whether or when the tenancy had been determined 
by the owner. Section 7 o f the 1833 Act provided clarity on this issue by deeming the right 
of action CO accrue one year after the tenancy commenced, unless it had already been 
determined. In Rontnarace v Lllchman18 Lord Millet explained the rationale behind the 
introduction of section 7: 
It was the deliberate policy of the legislature that the tide of owners who 
aHowed others to remain in possession o f their land for many years with their 
consent but without paying rell( or acknowledging their title should eventually 
be extinguished. 19 
This policy was also reflected in section 8 of the 1833 Act which provided that where land 
is subject to an oral periodic tenancy, tile right of action of me owner shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the expiry of the flrst period or, if renCl. was subsequently received, on the 
date rent was las t received. A clear distinction was drawn between the possession of tenants 
under such informal arrangements and that of a tenant in possession pursuant to a lease for 
a fixed term. Section 3 of dle 1833 Act provided that time only ran against the landlord 
entitled to the fee simple reversion when he became entitled to his estate in possession.20 
The proviso to section 7 was deemed necessary as the tenancy at will played an 
important role in classifying possession which was nor authorised by the legal ownership at 
a time when the common law and eguity were administered by separate courts. At common 
law, a trustee was entitled to possession, but the possession of a beneftciary was freguently 
authorised by the trus t deed or the trustee. Such possession was classified by tlle common 
law as being held pursuant to a tenancy at will. The proviso clarified that time did nO[ begin 
to run against a trustee o ne year after the commencement of the beneficiary's possession. 
Some of the conflict in the case1aw revolves around whether the proviso only applied to 
express trusts, so that time would start to run against a vendor who held the property on 
constructive trust one year after the purchaser went into possession. The proviso was 
omitted from the corresponding sectio n in the Limitation Act 193921 and in the 1980 Act 
the entire provision dealing with tenancies at will was repealed. The repercussions o f these 
refo rms for a purchaser- beneficiary in possession have yet to be fully teased out. 
THE EAR LY CASELAW 
One o f the chief difflculcies with the Law Commission's endorsement o f the approach 
taken in Bn'dges v j\1.etS is that it directly contradicts earlier caselaw on this issue, in particular 
Drum",ol/dv S cal/122 and Warren v MlIrray.23 In Drummond, four brothers had entered into 
an agreement for a building lease for 99 years in relation to a plo t of land next to the 
Thames. An Act o f Parliament was passed to reclaim land~from the Thames and ves ted it 
in the owners o f (he land o n its banks in accordance with their respective interests. The case 
concerned the reclaimed land which the court was satisfied became vested in the owners 
17 TIN First &port of CONJlJliuianm 011 RIal Property (1829). 
18 [2001J 1 WLR 1651. 
19 Ibid., at para. 12. 
20 T ime could onl), run against the landlord du ring the currency of the lease if the rcnt was paid to the wrong 
landlord o r if the landlord was also entitled to the lessee's interest in (he property. 
21 S. 9(1) of the Limit.,-ltion Act 1939. 
22 (1871) L" 6 QB 763. 
23 (1894) 2 Q B 648, CA. 
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subject to the equitable interest of the brothers pursuant to the Act. While leases were 
executed in favour of the brothers over the houses that were built, no lease was ever 
demanded in respect of the reclaimed land. After the 99 years had expired the owners 
claimed possession from the defendants who were the brothers' successors in title and 
argued that the owners' title had been extinguished by adverse possession. 
The court noted that before the 1833 Act was passed there was no possibility that the 
possession of the brothers during the term could be considered adverse. Time could not 
begin to run against a fee simple reversioner during an equitable term anymore than it could 
during a legal term. The defendants argued that the 1833 Act did away with the doctrine of 
non-adverse possession and consequently, after the transitional period of five years, the title 
of the owners was barred. This argument presumably depended on the brothers being 
classified as tenants at will with the result that their possession became adverse one year 
after the tenancy commenced. The court re jected this argument stating that the legislature 
could not have intended time to run against the owners during the 99-year term when they 
could nOt have interfered with the possession of the defendants without risking an 
injunction or an order for damages for a breach of trust. 24 The court noted that it was 
bound by the decision in Carrand v Tllck 2S where it was held that although a beneficiary in 
possession is deemed to be a tenant at will to his trustee, the proviso to section 7 means 
that the trustee's estate is not destroyed by the mere lapse of time.26 The final argument 
made by the defendants was that the proviso at the end of section 7 applied only to express 
trusts and had no application to the constructive trust which arises between a vendor and a 
purchaser. The defendants relied on Doe d. Stan/very v Rock27 in support of this point. The 
court was of the opinion that the Stanway case did not involve adverse possession by a 
contracting purchaser against a vendor, rather it involved a squatter in adverse possession 
against a contracting purchaser and a vendor and so it could not be cited as an authority on 
whether the proviso only applies to express trusts. However, the court reached the peculiar 
conclusion that, even if the proviso was limited in such a manner, the agreement between 
the brothers and the owners of the fee simple constituted an "actual direct trust", a term 
which it seems to use interchangeably for an express rrust.28 
The decision in Warren v MurrqJ9 includes a more detailed discussion of the law and 
therefore sheds slightly more light on the area. This dispute also involved an agreement for 
a building lease for 99 years. The builders went into possession and, although the covenant 
to build wo houses was complied with, no lease was ever asked for or granted. The interest 
of the builders under the agreement was assigned to the plaintiff's father and he and the 
plaintiff maintained possession until the term expired and the defendants took possession 
of the houses. The plaintiff, who contended that the defendants' title had been extinguished 
24 (1871) LR 6 QB 763, at p. 767. 
25 (1849) 8 CB 231. A mortgage had been redeemed but not cancelled which results in the legal title being held 
by the mortgagee on trust for the mortgagor. This case involved a claim by a mortgagor in possession that 
rime ran again st the mortgagee in respect of the satisfied term. 
26 The probable rationale behind the exception, as explained by the court in Garmnd v T1ICk, was to avoid the 
need for a trustee to take active steps to preserve his estate from being destroyed. 
27 (1842) Car & M 549. The facts of this case are a little confusing - following an agreement to purchase, the 
purchaser was left into possession and subsequently agreed to a~sign his equitable interest to a sub-purchaser 
who paid the original vendor. The original purchaser remained in possession until he died when his widow 
and subsequently one of her children, tbe defendant, took over possession. The plaintiff acquired the legal 
interest of the vendor and the equitable interest of the sub-purchaser and the court ruled that his interest had 
been extinguished by the possession of the original purchaser who held as a tenant at will. As the proviso onl}' 
applied to express trusts, time ran from the anniversary of the conunencement of the tenancy. 
28 (1871) LR 6 QB 763," pp. 768-9. 
29 [189412 QB 648. 
I' 'I 
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by virtue o f the staNte of limitations by the time chey took possess ion, los t his casco Lord 
Esher MR applied DrufJImond v Scant and concluded that if the defendants were unable to 
recover the land in question during the term of the lease, the Starute of Limitations had nO[ 
run against them. He explained: 
Looking at the agreement, it seems (Q me clear char although at common law they 
might say that the tenan ts were mere tenants at will, yet according to the law as 
a whole, including the equity doctrines applicable (0 rhis case, dlCY (the trustees) 
could not exercise their will and fe-enter, because, if d1 C tenan ts had performed 
their obligations wlder the agreement, a coun of equity would at once in terfere 
by injunction to prevent their being dispossessed and would compel specific 
performance of the agreement.30 
He was of the opinion that section 7 of the 1833 Act app lied to "tenancies at will pure and 
simple, where there was no clog or difficulty such as arises OUt of an agreement like that in 
ques tion here". Kay LJ added that the circumstances of the plaintiff were in any case 
covered by the proviso to section 7. He noted that, where a purchaser enters in to an 
agreement for sale, a constructive trUS t arises regardless of whether me agreement is to 
purchase a fee simple or a leasehold term. H e was of. the opinion that the proviso 
encompassed such trusts which meant that a right of action did nOt auromatically accrue to 
the vendor one year after the purchaser went into possession.31 
In both lf7arrefl and Drummond the court seemed to assume that, if adverse possession 
could be proved, the purchaser would have extinguished the title of the fee simple owner. 
However, in borh siruations the purchaser was entitled to an equitable lease, which cannot 
exist widlOut an equitable fee simple reversion. A right of action could not have accrued 
against a legal fee simple reversioner during the currency of the lease and if, as the 1833 Act 
sets out, its provisions apply to equitable interests as they apply to legal estates,32 time could 
not run against the eguitable fec simple reversioner until the determination of the equitable 
lease. The court in Drummond only referred to this point in passing33 and it would seem that 
it was nO[ argued at all in the lf7arren case. It is submitted that if adverse possession can take 
place in such circumstances it must operate solely to bar the legal title to the lease which 
temains vested in the vendor pursuant to the contract for sale. T ime cannOt run in relation 
to rhe fee simple estate until the legal or equitable lease has expired. 
(Parrell and Dmmmond were discussed in two New Zealand cases reported at me 
beginning of the twen tieth century.34 The English cases were distinguished by the court in 
Glen'!) v Ratbbone which was satisfied that a sub-purchaser was in adverse possession against 
the original vendor but, in Ormond v Portas, they were followed and the court ruled that the 
defendant, who was in possession pursuant to an agreement fo r a lease, was not in adverse 
possession against the owner. The judgments delivered in both New Zealand cases grappled 
wid1 me distinction between me posicion of a vendor who ~as agreed to sell the fee simple 
and the vendor who has only agreed to the g ran t o f a lease in relation to the property. In 
Glem!) v Rathbone, \Xlilliams J stated that if this had been a case of a straightforward 
agreement to purchase a fcc simple, section 7 would apply as the purchaser would be deemed 
to be a tenant at will of d1c vendor. However, he fel t that the vendor would not have been a 
trustee \.vithin the meaning o f the proviso to that section. The meaning of the term "trustee" 
in the context of the proviso should, he said, be limited to cases where the terms of the trust 
30 IFarrell v Mflrray (1894J 2 QB 648, at pp. 652-3. 
31 Ibid., at p. 658. 
32 S. 24. 
33 (1871) LR 6 Q B 763, at p. 767. 
34 Clem!), v &tbbl)lU (1900) 20 NZLR I; Orrlll)lld v Pl)rlas [1922J NZLR 570. 
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contemplate the retention of the legal fee simple br the trustee during the suggested period 
of limitation. He noted that where a lessee enters into possession under an agreement for a 
lease for 99 years, he or she has an eCJuitable lease for that period. The owner of the legal fee 
simple holds that land on trust to grant such a lease to the intending lessee throughout the 
agreed term. The lessee's possession is entirely consistent with the right of the lessor to retain 
the legal fee simple during the whole proposed term. He felr that Dmmmond and (Farren could 
be explained on the basis that it was necessary for rhe trustee to retain the legal fee simple in 
order to carry ou( the crust. Therefore, the proviso applied to prevent time running under 
section 7. However, where an agreement to purchase the fee simple is involved and the 
purchaser has paid the purchase money and been let into possession, the continued retention 
by [he vendor of the legal fee simple is directly antagonistic to the possession of the 
purchaser and so time can run in favour of the purchaser.35 \X'illiams J also discussed the dicta 
in (P'arren and Dmmmond which suggests that time cannot run against the owner if the owner 
would have been prevented from recovering possession of the land by the existence of some 
equitable remedy. He felt that these comments could not be taken in their widest sense as a 
crue exposition of the law and were certainly not necessary upon the facts of those cases to 
arrive at the decision made.36 Tn Ormond v Portas, the court noted that Glenny v Rathbone did 
not weaken the effect of tile judgment in IFarre" as applied to the case of a lessee in 
possession under an agreemen t for lease.37 
These New Zealand cases imply that although a purchaser in possession under a 
contract for a sa le of the fee simple mar bar the legal estate of the vendor, a purchaser 
under an agreement for a lease may not do so. As already mentioned, the Law Commission 
of England and Wales is of the opinion that a purchaser who is in possession who has not 
paid the entirety of the price will not be in adverse possession as such possession is 
attributable to the concract and not his or hcr absolute equitable interest. The Law 
Commission noted that, were it otherwise, the validity of agreements for teases as a 
substitute for legal leases would be undermined.38 It is difficult to follow the reasoning of 
the Law Commission in this regard; perhaps it viewed the payment of rent over the term 
of the lease as making up the purchase price under the contract. However, such an approach 
would prevent an adverse possession application by a purchaser who had paid the purchase 
price and gone into possession pursuant to an agreement to purchase a regis tered leasehold 
estate. It is difficult to see why such an applicant should not benefit from Schedule 6, 
paragraph 5(3) of the 2002 Act, regardless of whether rent was paid during the term. The 
landlord has remedies for the non-payment of rem which he or she may avail of both 
before and after the statutory transfer of title from the registered lessee to the 
purchaser-sCJuatter on proof of 10 years' adverse possession. However, where a registered 
freehold or leasehold owner enters imo an agreement for a lease or a sub-lease, paragraph 
5(3) does not apply as the lease has not as yet been granted or registered. Therefore, the old 
35 Glm'!} v Rathborte (1900) 20 NZLR I, at pp. 28-9. WilliMfls J ruled [flat [he plaintiff-suo-purchaser was not a 
tenant at will to the original vendor. There was no evidence that the original vendor knew that he had 
purchased the property or had given any recognition of his possession which could give rise to the inference 
that it was the intention of both parties [Q create sueh a [cnancy. Therefore, s. 7 of the 1833 Act ,",,"liS 
inapplicable and it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that a right of action had accrued within the 
meaning of s. 2 (at pp. 3()....1). I-Ie was satisfied [hat a right of action had accrued at law and the existence of 
some equitable remedy did not preclude a finding of adverse possession. 
36 Ibid., at pp. 3\-3. Even if the possessor did have a remedy in (guit)'. Williams J noted that the owner had a 
hostile right at 1:\\1.'. The ubject of [he 1833 Act was to get rid of hostile rights. If an entire right can be barred 
(where thert· is no cnticlemenr to an eguitable remedy) why not a part of [hat right which is hostile to the rights 
of the person in possession? 
37 [! 9221 NZLR 570, at p. 580. 
38 See Law Comm No 271, n. ! above. at para 14.43,11. !55. 
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rules whjch govern adverse possession of unregistered leasehold land set out in Fairweather 
v Sf Mary/tbone Proper!) Ud39 will apply. It was held in that case that the squatter does not 
acquire the titlc of me lessee on the expiry of the limitation period. The original lessee 
remains liable on the covenants in the lease and, although he may no longer eject the 
squatter he may surrender the lease to the landlord who will become entitled [Q immediate 
possession. I f the owner holds the land on a constructive trust to grant a lease to the 
purchaser and the legal title to the lease is extinguished, the possible ramifications of the 
Fairweather decision for the vendor and the purchaser become ridiculously complicated. The 
vendor clearly retains an equitable fee simple reversion and time cannot run in respect of 
this estate until the expiry of the term of the eguitable lease. However, me extinguishment 
of the legal title to the lease must surely go hand in hand wim the extinguishment of any 
rights which the vendor had pursuant to the Contract. It is arguable that adverse possession 
in such circumstances operates to deprive the vendor of the right to enforce the covenants 
which the parties had agreed to include in the lease. In contrast, possession for the 
limitation period may confer the best of both worlds 0(1 the person who had agreed to 
purchase the lease: that person could claim the benefit of certain covenants under his or her 
eguitable lease when it suited and retain the option of relying on the title acguired through 
adverse possession which seems to be free of such coveqan ts. 
An approach which precludes the running of time against a vendor who holds under a 
constructive trust to gran t a lease is to be preferred, regardless of whether the purchaser 
has paid the entire purchase price. Unlike an agreement to purchase a fee simple or take an 
assignment of an existing lease, which only gives rise to a bare truSt, an agreement to grant 
a lease gives rise to a constructive trust which envisages an active role being played by the 
vendor-landlord during the currency of the eguitable lease. Such an approach accords well 
with the provisions of tlle legislation which prevent the extinguishment of a trustee's estate 
if a right of action of any person entitled ro a beneficial interest in the land either has not 
accrued or has not been barred. 4O The eguitable fee simple revers ion implicit in an 
agreement to grant a lease should be viewed as preventing time running against the vendor 
during the term of the equitable lease. Such a purchaser who wishes to regularise his or her 
occupation should be forced to rely on the remedy of specific performance which will 
ensure that the vendor is guaranteed the protection of the covenants the parties agreed to 
include in the lease. 
M ORE RECENT CASELA W 
As already mentioned, Bridges v i\{ees41 is the authority typically cited in support of the 
proposition that a purchaser under an incomplete contract for sale can extinguish the title 
of the vendor through adverse possession. The plaintiff and the defendant owned 
neighbouring houses and the plaintiff had entered into an oraJ contract to purchase a small 
piece of land at the rear of both houses from a company. The purchaser went into 
possession aftcr paying the deposit and by 1937 he had paid the entire purchase price. I n 
1955 the defendant purchased the same piece of land from the Iiguidator of the company 
and proceeded to register his ownership in the Land Registry. The plaintiff sought a 
declaration chat he was the beneficial owner of the land and a rectification of the register 
to reflect his overriding interests which arose due to his adverse possession and his actual 
occupation of the land. 
39 [i903[ AC 510. 
40 See s. 18(3) of the 1980 Act, previously s. 7(3) of the 1833 Act. 
41 [1957] 1 Ch 475. 
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Harman J was satisfied that the purchaset initially went into possession of the property 
with the vendor's permission and pursuant [Q a licence. However, when the vendor's lien on 
the property for the unpaid purchase monies disappeared, the character of the purchaser's 
possession changed. At that point, the vendor became a bare trustee and the purchaser 
became the sale beneficial owner. The vendor, as trustee, was prima facie entitled to resume 
possession and as he did not exercise that right for 12 years the plaintiff argued that it was 
extinguished and he was required to hold the legal estate on trust for the plaintiff.42 
I n discussing whether a purchaser was a person in whose favour the period of limitation 
could run, Harmon J referred to section 7(3) of the Limitation Act 1939, which provided: 
Where any land is held upon a trust ... and (he period prescribed by this An has 
expired for bringing an action to recover the land by the trustees, the estate of 
the trustees shall not be extinguished if and so long as the right of action of any 
person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land ... has not accrued or been 
barred by this Act, but if and when every such right of action has been so barred, 
the estate of the trustees shall be extinguished. 
As no one other than the purchaser had a beneficial interest from 1937 onwards, 
Harmon J concluded that time could and did run in his favour and therefore by 1949 the 
trustee's title would have been extinguished (but for section 75 of the Land Registration Act 
1925).43 Harmon J examined the argument which had swayed the court in Dmtlltllond and 
Warren, that the vendor could never have brought an effective action to recover the land 
because he would have been met by d1e plea that the whole beneficial interest was vested in 
rhe purchaser. Harmon J ruled that the question cannot rurn on whether the action would 
have succeeded or not. He cited Re Cussons Ltd44 in support of this approach even though 
counsel for the plaintiff had acknowledged that this case had been criticised because of the 
court's failure to refer to the proviso in section 7 of the 1833 Act. 45 Harmon J noted that 
since the proviso was omitted from section 9 of the 1939 Act, time can now run in favour 
of a beneficiary. He quoted Underhill on Trusts who staced that a trustee, including a 
constructive trustee, can be divested of a legal estate by possession of a person entitled in 
equity in exactly the same way as if the beneficiary were a stranger.46 He acknowledged that 
no precise authority was given by Underhill but he felt that this proposition was implicit in 
section 7(3) (outlined above) and section 7(5) which provided: 
Where any settled land or any land held on a trust for sale is in the possession of 
a person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land ... not being a person solely 
and abso lutely entitled thereto, no right of action shall be deemed ... to accrue 
during such possession to any person in whom the land is vested as trustee, or 
to any other person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land. 
Basically, H armon J felt that it was implicit in borh subsections that a person solely and 
absolutely entitled co the beneficial ownership could be in adverse possession against his 
or her trustee. 
42 Bridgu v Mus 11957] 1 eh 475, al pp. 484---5. 
43 Ibid. 
44 (1904) 73 LJ eh 2%. In this case, partners who had incorporated neglected to transfer rhe disputed property 
imo the name of the company. The court was satis fied that the partners held the property on a bare trust for 
the company and [har it was possible that such trustees without duties may lose thdr trust estate at the end 
of 12 years if they aUowcd the beneficiary to remain in posscssion and did not interfcre. 
4S [1957) 1 eh 475, at p. 482. 
46 Ibid., at p. 486. 
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Harmon J noted that even if he was wrong about his interpretation of section 7(3) and 
(5), the plaintiff had another String to his bow. A plaintiff was entitled to a rectification of 
the register on the basis that his or her interest under the contract coupled with the 
plaintiff's actual occupation of the property rendered it an overriding interest which bound 
the defendam on reglstration. 47 It is submitted that the second reason which Harmon J gave 
for his decision is less open to challenge, particularly since the introduction of the 
Limitation Act 1980. In its 1977 Report, the Law Commission noted that time only ran 
against a licensor on the determination of the licence and agreed with those who had 
commented on this issue that the divergent treatment of tenancies at will and licences was 
artificial and unduly harsh on those categorised as lessors.48 The Law Commission was 
convinced that the distinction between a tenancy at will and a gratuitous licence is, at best, 
tenuous. Accordingly, under the 1980 Act, time docs not begin to run in favour of the 
occupier until the tenancy has actually been determined. Therefore, if the occupation of a 
purchaser continues to be classified as that of a tenant at will, the determination of the 
tenancy would seem to be a prerequisite to establishing adverse possession. 
Jourdan describes Harmon J's decision in Bn'dges v Mus on the adverse possession point 
as questionable,49 but continues: 
The question whether the decision was correct is, however, now largely academic. 
The decision was based on section 9(1) of me Limitation Act which provided 
mat time ran against a landlord of a tenant at will from me first anniversary of 
me grant of the tenancy. That subsection was tepealed with effect from 1 August 
1980. Accordingly, if me same case feU to be decided now, a different result 
would be reached. 50 
The starus of a purchaser in possession was considered more recently by the Court of 
Appeal in l-fyde v Pearce. 51 This decision is frequently cited to suppOrt the proposition that 
a purchaser who has not paid the entire purchase price cannot be in adverse possession. The 
purchaser went into possession after making a successful bid at an auction and paying tlle 
deposit. The completion of the sale was delayed as a dispute arose over the level of the 
abatement in the purchase price which the purchaser was entitled to because a small portion 
of the property which he had contracted to buy had already been sold. The court concluded 
that although his initial possession was with the licence of the vendor, that licence was 
determined by a letter sent in 1958 which demanded that that the purchaser rerum the 
keys. 52 The Court was satisfied that a right of action had accrued to tllC vendor at that time. 
However, Templeman LJ continued: 
... in (he peculiar circumscances of this case, it seems (0 me (hac it is not 
sufficient to show that a right of action had accrued. Me Hyde must show some 
further qualicy, namely adverse possession. 53 
This was an unusual approach as section 10 of tfle Limitation Act 1939 specifica!ly 
provided that no right of action to recover land shall be treated as accruing unless someone 
was in adverse possession. 54 It is not clear why the COurt decided to determine these issues 
47 Bn'dgn v Men [195711 Ch 475, at pp. 486-7. 
48 Law Reform COlTunirtt:e, 7infl!)"Firsl RLport (Final Report on Limitation of Actions) (Scprcmber 197T). 
at para. 3.55. 
49 S Jourdan. AdVfrst POJSeui()fl (London: Buttc:rworths Lexis Nc)(is 2003). at para. 28.29. 
50 Ibid., at para. 28.30. 
51 [19821 I WLR 560. 
52 Ibid., at p. 569 
53 Ibid., at p. 570. 
54 See also M Dockray, "'W'hat is adverse possession: Hyde and seck" (1983) 46 MLR 89. at p. 92 . 
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separately. The court poimed to a number of factors which illustrated that the purchaser 
was nO{ in adverse possession. It noted that Mr Hyde was not a squatter without a shadow 
of a claim of right - he was the equitable owner pursuam to the contract, subject to rhe 
vendot's lien for the price. Also, his possession was attributable to a subsisting contract for 
sale. He had never changed his status as a purchaser in possession pending completion by 
doing something which showed that he repudiated the contract. The court also argued that 
litigation by the vendors may nor have resulted in the vendors obtaining possession. Finally, 
the court referred to the final letter which had been sent by the vendor's solicitor to 
Mr Hyde proposing that the dispute over the purchase price be referred for arbitration. The 
court argued that this lener was eCluivocal and did not make it clear whether the vendors 
were still requiring possession to be handed over to them. 55 
It is submitted that these were all issues that should have been considered in assessing 
whether a cause of action had accrued to the vendor. Either the purchaser was in 
possession pursuant to a licence, in which case no cause of action had accrued, or his 
licence had determined, in which case a cause of action had accrued. I f you apply the 
reasoning in Bn·dges v Mees, the purchaser's licence would have automatically terminated if 
the entire purchase price had been paid. The repudiation of the contraC( would also have 
ended the licence and, i.n this particular case, the parties had agreed that the licence could 
be determined by a demand for the keys. If the lener demanding the keys terminated the 
licence, a right of action would have accrued to the vendor at that point and time must have 
run against him regardless of whether the contract continued to subsist or not. On balance, 
it seems that Mr H yde should have succeeded in his adverse possession claim and his rights 
should, therefore, have bound Mt Pearce as an overriding interest when he bought the 
property from the vendors. Even if the court had ruled that Mr Hyde was not in adverse 
possession, he should have succeeded on the basis that his interest under the contract 
coupled with his actual occupation of the property amounted to an overriding interest. The 
court ruled that Mr Pearce was not bound by the contract as it had not been registered as 
an estate contract but these rules only apply to unregistered land.56 It is submitted that Hyde 
v Pearce should not be interpreted to mean that time can only run against the vendor if the 
entire purchase price has been paid. A purchaser can also be in adverse possession if his or 
her licence to occupy the premises is validly terminated and, in such circumstances, his or 
her Status as a purchaser under an incomplete contract is irrelevant. 
McLean v McErlean57 provides a useful illustration of the attitude of the Northern Irish 
courts to this issue although the removal of the tenancy at will provision in the Limitation 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1989 may cast doubt on its continuing relevance. The purchasers 
in this case were sand merchants who had entered into a contract to purchase land from the 
defendant's father with the sole purpose of extracting and selling sand for use in building 
work. They went into possession with the consent of the vendor and, by 1958, they had 
paid the entire purchase price. They extracted sand on the land until it ran out sometime in 
1964 or 1965 and afte rwards they occasionally used the land for washing sand. After the 
purchasers had contracted to buy the land, the vendor continued to use it for grazing and 
used a small amoum of it for cropping. Neither of these activities interfered with the 
purchasers ' usc of the land. After the vendor died, his execuror commenced an action in 
trespass and the purchasers applied for an order that they were entitled to be registered as 
owners of the land by virtue of their adverse possession. The court had to decide whether 
the purchasers had barred the legal title of the vendor, or the vendor had barred the 
5S 1198211 WLR 560, al pp. 569-70. 
56 Dockray has also commenced on chis in "Whac is adverse possession?", 11. 54 above. 
57 II 983] NI 258. 
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beneficial ritle of the purchasers. The Coun of Appeal found in favour of the purchasers 
and Gibson J noted [\Vo differences between the Northern Irish Srarute of Limitations 1958 
and the English Limitation Act 1939. Firstly, the Northern Irish version of the tcnancy at 
will provision included a proviso that a beneficiary shall nor be deemed co be a tenant at will 
to his or her trustee for the purposes of mat subsection.S8 However, this proviso was not 
included in the 1939 English version of the tenancy at will provision.59 The second 
distinction is replicated in current icgisiarion.60 The defmition of a "trustee" provided in 
the Northern J rish version is limited to an express trustee and docs not include a person 
whose fiduciary relationship arises merely by construction or implication of the law.61 In 
contrast, all references to trusts in the English version include constructive or implied 
trusts.62 The Irish Statute of Limitations 1957 is identical to the Northern Irish legislation 
in these respects.63 Gibson J concluded that, where the trust in question is constructive, a 
person entitled to the beneficial estate would begin to run a title after the flrSt year. He 
stated that it was obvious why an express trustee should not have to rake active steps to 
preserve his estate but noted that these considerations do not apply where the trust in 
question is constructive, for example where a purchaser has been let into possession and has 
paid the purchase price. The vendor is a bare trustee and his only duty is to convey and 
therefore there is no need co preserve his estate in order co allow him to perform the trust. 
The purchaser could and did in such circumstances' commence to run a statutory title 
against the vendor. He also referred to section 29(4) of the 1958 Act (which corresponds 
to section 7 (5) of the Li.mimtion An 1939) CO suppon his decision and implies that a right 
of action may accrue to a trustee if the beneficiary is solely and absolutely entitled. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning briefly the recent Irish High Coun decision in Moley v 
Fu64 which concerned an agreement to sell two sites for mobile homes. The transaction 
was never completed and Laffoy J noted that, if the purchasers had paid the full purchase 
price. the vendor would be deemed by law to be a bare constructive trustee. In such 
circumstances, if the vendor had remained in possession of the land he would have barred 
the beneficial interest of the purchasers and if, on the other hand. the purchasers had gone 
inro possession, the outsmnding legal estate of the vendor would have been barred. On the 
facts. Laffoy J was satisfied that the vendor had never received the purchase price from the 
purchasers. She also noted that although the \rendor had continued CO exercise acts of 
ownership over the disputed plot during the period which followed the negotiation of the 
deal, the purchasers had not engaged in acts of possession suffICient co prove adverse 
possession during the same period. 
58 S. 21 of the Statute of LLlllllauons 1958. 
59 S. 9 of the Lunitataon Act 1939. 
60 Se~ s. 2(3) of the Lurutanon (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 and s. 38 of the Lunltauon Act 1980. 
61 S. 74(2) of the 1958 Act. 
62 s. 3 I of the Lmlltauon Act 1939. 
63 See s. 2(2)(a) of the Statute of Lururatlons 1957. 
64 12007] IEHC 143. 
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Is A PURCHASER IN POSSESSION OR AN OCCUPANT NEGOTIATING A PURCHASE, 
A LICENSEE OR A TEN ANT AT WILL? 
As has already been mentioned, in England and Northern Ireland since the enaCtment of 
the t 980s legislation dealing with the limitation of actions, a right of action will only accrue 
on the determination of a licence or a tenancy at will. The distinction between licences and 
tenancies at will as regards the accrual of a right of action continues to be maintained by 
the Irish Statute of Limitation 1957. Therefore, in Ireland the success of the purchaser's 
adverse possession claim may be dependent on whether the purchaser is classified as a 
tenam at will. Tn Bddges v "'lees and McLta" v AlcEr/eall, the purchaser was classified as a 
tenant at will,65 while, in H)'de v Pearce, he was classified as a licensee. 
Traditionally, exclusive possession was trea ted as the sale distinguishing feature of a 
tenancy at will. However, for the last 50 years the courts have been prepared to recognise 
an arrangement that confers exclusive possession on the occupant as a licence if satisfied 
that this was the imention of the parties. The courts will more readily infer a licence if, in 
the words of Denning LJ in Facchini v Brysoll "there has been something in the 
circumstances, such as a family arrangement, and act of friendship or generosity ... to 
negative any intention to create a tenancy".66 For example, in Heslop v BJlrIIS,67 the court 
described the arrangement between Mr and Mrs Burns, who had occupied a house for 16 
years without paying rent, and Mr Timms, its owner, as akin to a family arrangement. He 
was a good friend of the Burns, visited them freguently, had become a godfather for one 
of their daughters and paid for her education. There was no evidence co infer a [cnancy at 
will and, therefore, while the licence continued, a right of action did not accrue co the 
owner.68 Scarman LJ noted that the courtS will be less and less inclined to infer a tenancy 
at will from an exclusive occupation of indefinite duration due to the emetgence of the 
licence [0 occupy into prominence as a possible mode of land-holding.69 He added: 
It may be that the tenancy at will can now serve only one legal purpose and that 
is to protect the inrerests of an occupier during a period of transition. I f one 
looks (0 the classic cases in which tenancies at will continue to be inferred, 
65 [n Glm'!) v Rothbont (1900) 20 NZLR 1 and Ormond v Porta! [1922] NZLR 570, th~ COurt also classified a 
purchaser under a contract for sale or an agreement for the grant of a [ease as a tenant at \1.;11, although it ",·as 
satisfied the proviso to s. 7 of the 1833 Act would prevent tune running ag2inst the vendor ",·here the 
agreement was for {he grant of a lease. 
66 [1952] 1 TLR 1386, at pp. 1389-90. 
67 [1974[ 3 ALL ER 406. 
68 A similar approach had been t.1ken 111 Cobb v Lmt f1952] 1 All ER J 199 and in HII.ght! v Griffin {1969J 1 
WLR 23. 
69 Much of the case\aw winch discusses the d1stlnction !xC\\.-·een a rcnancr at ",;11 and a hcence Involves claims 
by occupiers that ther were entitled to certain statutory protecuons avatlable to tenants. Frequently, [he 
occupier \I.'ent into possession pending the negotiation of a lease or a sale or held ovcr possession pending 
the negotiation of a [cnewal of a lease. A tenam at ",.till does not qualify for thc securiry of tenure arforded to 
busmess tenants pursuant to thc Landlord and 'fenanr Act 1954, see 1I7Jmltr v Merrtr I' 97J] J AU ER 829. 
I lol.1.·evcr,11 is dangerously easr for such an arrangemcnr to become a penO(\!c tenancy on thc pa}"lnelll of rent 
and such a findmg \I.·ou[d bring the rcnanC}' within rh~ protection of the 1954 Act. 1\ reSidential tenancy at 
wtll may corne within the Rent Restrictions Acts provided that thc paymcnts made by the occupant do indeed 
rcpresent rcnt and not the pa}'mcnt of rhe purchase pncc by instalments: sec Dill/thorne and Short v If'~ill! nnd 
AlIolbtr [19431 1 All ER 577; Fralin! inchon DU'tlopmenl! Uti v Stf""P ]1943] 2 ALL ER 601. There is an 
1ncreasmg tcndencr on the parts of the couns to claSSIfy occupation pendlllg the ncgotiation of a formal 
agreement, particularly thosc III occupation ror comrnerclal purposes, as being pursuant 10 a licence: see Baiht 
v Flilimof/Smilh andAnolhtr ["1961] NZLR 901; IJaacv Hold Dt ram Uti [1960] 1 All ER 348. ThiS cla~sification 
will have 110 impact on th~ rights of a business occuplcr as neither a licensee or a tenant at \1.1.11 is entitled to 
protection pursuant to thc 1954 Act, and, since the enactmcnt of the Housing Act 1988, rCSldenttal tenants 
are unlikely to bencfit from a reduced rent or Increascd security of tenure. 
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namely, the case of someone who goes into possession prior to a contract of 
purchase, or of someone who, with the consent of the landlord, holds over aftcr 
the expiry of rus lease, one sees that in each dlcrc is a tcansicional period during 
which negotiations are being conducted touching the estate or interest in the land 
that has (0 be protected, and the tenancy at "vill is an apt legal mechanism to 
protect the occupier during such a period of rraosician; he is there and can keep 
out trespassers; he is there with the consent of the landlord and can keep out the 
landlord as long as that consem is maintaincd.70 
&tlmarace v ullchlllan,71 which involved an appeal from Trinidad and Tobago, shows the 
implications of classifying such transitional occupation as a tenancy at will. The appellam 
had entered inw possession of the land with the consem of its owners, her uncle and aunt 
in 1974. They had told her she could live on the land until she could afford to buy it and 
she built a house and lived there with her family without paying any rent. Her uncle died in 
1977 and her aunt died in 1988 and the respondent had periodically challenged her right to 
live on the land. She claimed to have acquired a possessory title by virrue of section 8 of 
the Real Property Limitation Ordinance 1940 which provided that time began to run against 
a tenam at will one year after the commencemem of the tenancy. The Court of Appeal 
found that she was in possession pursuant to a licence which had terminated either in 1985 
by the service of a notice to guit or in 1988 on the death of her aunt and therefore she had 
not succeeded in extinguishing the respondem's ride. The Privy Council disagreed with this 
classification and noted that although the appellant was allowed into occupation as part of 
a family arrangement and at least in part as an aCt of generosity, the intention was that she 
would purchase the land when she could afford it - this was one of the classic 
circumstances in which a tenancy at will arose. She mereforc succeeded in her claim for 
adverse possession. 
In Bellew v Bellew,72 the Irish Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to regard evcn 
the occupation of a person in negotiations with thc owner as being pursuant to a licence. 
However, in the circumstances, the classification did not prevent time running as the court 
was satisfied that the licence had ended. The plaintiff held a life estate in the farmlands 
surrounding Barmcath Castle, where he lived with his father, his wife and his children. He 
began an affair and moved to England to live wirh the woman, neglecting to make any 
provision for the maintenance of his wife and family. The plaintiff permitted the father to 
continue farming the land whilc negotiations were taking place in rclation to an agreement 
for a lease and the provision to be made for plaintiff's family. These negotiations broke 
down in 1963 and the father remained in occupation and farmed the land as if it was his 
own. In 1978 the p laintiff sought a declaration that the lands were vested in him as tenant 
for life but the Supreme Court held that this estate had been extinguished by the father's 
adverse possession. Griffm J, with whom Hederman J agre~d. was of the opinion that the 
father originally went into possession pursuant to a licence but that the licence terminated 
when the negotiations broke down and from that point onwards he was in adverse 
possession. O'Higgins CJ preferred to classify his occupation as a tenancy at will as he wenr 
into occupation pending negotiations for a long-term lease. Therefore, a right of action 
accrued one year after he commenced occupation and the title of the plai.ntiff would have 
been extinguished by 1974. He noted that the intricacies of running a large farm with a 
danger of trespass and the possibility of agistment and other contracts required that the 
person running such a farm would have some legal interest therein. 
70 f1974] 3 An ER 406, at p. 416 . 
71 1200111 WLR 1651. 
72 (1982J IR 447. 
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1r is difficult to see what the tenancy at will can achieve in such circumstances that a 
licence cannot. Previously, when exclusive possession was the sole determinant of whether 
an occupant held under a tenancy or a licence, an action in trespass could only be 
maintained by a tenam. Nowadays, a licensee may maintain such an action. A licensee may 
also be entitled [0 contracrual notice or reasonable notice to vacate the premises and, 
therefore, the licensee may even have more security of tenure than a tenant at will. In 
addition, it is difficult to see how an agistment contraCt made by a tenant at will would be 
more secure than one made by a licensee. 
It would appear that the tenancy at will no longer plays a distinctive role in property law 
and these arrangements could easily be absorbed by the licence. It is increasingly difficult to 
justify the distinction between such tenancies and licences as regards the accrual of a right 
of action and it is submitted that Ireland should follow the lead of England and Northern 
Ireland and delete the tenancy at will provision from the Starute of Limitations 1957. This 
appears even more pressing in light of recent recommendations for tile abolition of the 
tenancy at will.13 
However, the abolition of the tenancy at will provision does not alleviate the confusion 
over whether a purchaser under an incomplete contract for sale can be in adverse 
possess ion. It is important co bear in mind the consequences of recognising adverse 
possession in such circumstances. I f the vendor's title is extinguished, presumably he or she 
no longer has any rights pursuant to the contract and so will no longer be entitled to the 
benefit of casements which were to be reserved or restrictive covenants which were to be 
imposed on the purchaser in the deed. By neglecting to formalise the transfer, he or she will 
have lost the rights that would have been conferred by it. The remaining difficulty is 
identifying tile point at which the purchaser's possession becomes adverse. This issue could 
be deared up by inserting a "deeming provision" - where a purchaser is allowed into 
possession before the completion of the transaction, a right of action shall be deemed to 
accrue to the vendor on the determination of the licence to occupy or the payment of the 
entire purchase price, whichever occurs earlier. However, the definition of a "purchaser" for 
the purposes of benefiting from the deeming provision should exclude a purchaser under 
an enforceable agreement fo r the grant of a lease. As mentioned earlier, such a purchaser 
should be forced to rely on the remedy of specific performance so that the landlord is nO[ 
deprived of the benefit of the agreed covenants. 
Part 2 - Adverse possession by a purchaser entitled to an equity by estoppel 
The Land Registration Act 2002 provides that where it would be unconscionable because 
of an eguity by estoppel for the registered owner to seek to dispossess the applicant and 
that applicant is entitled to be registered as owner, an application for registration on the 
basis of adverse possession will succeed in spite of an objection by the registered owner.74 
The adjudicator has jurisdiction to consider the elements of the proprietary estoppel claim 
and is expressly authorised to award a lesser remedy if it would be unconscionable for the 
registered owner to seek to dispossess the applicant but the circumstances are not such that 
the applicant ought to be registered as owner.75 
Since tile enactment of section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1989, contracts for the sale of land must be made in writing and incorporate all the 
. 
73 Sec Law Reform Commission, CO/Ill//t(ltion raptr on Cmtra/ UIW of Lllldlorrl (lild Ttl/o/lt Llw (LRC CP28-2003), 
at p:ua. 1.24. A "tenancy" is defined as nor includIng a tenancy at will in s. 3 of the draft Landlord and Tenant 
Hill included in the Rrport on lIN Llwof ulIId/om (lild Tm(llll (LRC 85-2(07). 
74 Sch . 6, para. 5(2). 
75 S. 110(4) of the 2002 ~cl. 
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terms expressly agreed in one document which has been signed by both parties. Although 
the doctrine of part performance was not specifically abolished, the fact that an oral 
contract is no longer valid renders the doctrine defunct as there is no contractual obligation 
which can be partly performed. The Law Commission, when recommending the reforms 
introduced by section 2, noted that me presenr law provided sufficient alternative remedies 
to deal with the hard cases which may arise where one party unconscionably seeks to take 
advantage of a failure to comply with the statutory formalitiesJ6 In particular, the Law 
Commission envisaged that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel would step into the breach 
and provide a remedy for certain purchasers who had entered into informal Contracts for 
saleJ7 This doctrine applies where a person represented to the claimant that he or she had 
rights in the land and the claimant acted to his or her detriment in reliance on this 
representation in circumstances where it would be unconscionable to aUow the representor 
to insist on the strict legal position. Until such an equity has been established to the 
satisfaction of the court, the claimant has only an inchoate right; once it has been 
established the court has a broad discretion as to how co satisfy the equity. It may order the 
landowner to convey the freehold or some other right to the c1aimant,78 it may order the 
payment of compensation,79 or simply make an order rc;straining the owner from enforcing 
his or her strict legal rights.80 
The application of this doctrine to invalid COntracts for sale has proved very 
controversial and poims up a failure on the part of the Law Commission and Parliament. 
when proposing and enacting section 2 of the 1989 Act, "co consider either adequately or 
in sufficient detail which potentially hard cases can be effectively deal t with by existing 
doctrines".81 T he main sticking point is whether reliance on the doctrine permits a claimant 
to bypass the fo rmalities set out in section 2 of the 1989 Act. Some of the caselaw82 
requires the claimant to prove what Dixon refers to as a "double assurance".83 for example, 
a representation by the defendant that he is a man of his word or thar the agreement is 
binding in honour. This approach enables the court co describe the doctrine in terms of 
remedying the unconscionability caused by this assurance rather than facilitating the 
enforcement of an invalid contract.84 Another development is the increasing tendency on 
the part of the COur ts to restrict the remedy of proprietary estoppel in cases involving 
invalid contracts to situations which also give rise to a constructive crusr,85 This limitation 
is seen as necessaty to square the enforcement of the COl1tran with the failure to comply 
with the formalities imposed by section 2 of the 1989 Act, as section 2(5) provides that 
nothing in thjs section affects the creation or operation of resulting, implied or constructive 
trusts. Some have criticised this approach as unnecessary, as a remedy based on the doctrine 
of proprietary estoppel is an independent cause of action which does not seek to enforce 
76 FormaliliujorGJIIlmctJjorSait ric of lAlld. Law Comm No 164 (1987), at para. 4.13. 
77 Ibid., at pan 5. 
78 See PaJCO( v Turner /19791 I WLR 431; Cmbb v /Imn DC /1976] Ch 179. 
79 Sec Dodsworth v DodJII)ortb (1973) 228 EG 1115.80 
80 See Mahart~j v Cballd /1986] AC 898. 
81 C Davis, "ESLOppd: an adc'Iuate substitute for parr performance?" (1993) 13 OJLS 99. 
82 Sec Uf!)'dv Dugdale [2002]2 P & CR 13 and EthcrtonJ's decision III Cobbe v )'tomanJ RowJl1antlYl!ltllf Ltd {2005] 
EWHC 266. 
83 1\1 Dixon, "Proprietary estoppel :lnd formalities in l:lnd law and the Land Registration Act 2002: a theory of 
unconscionability" III E Cooke (cd.), Modern Sllidiu in Properly Lo~I vol. 3 (Oxford: I Ian Publishing 2003); 
M Dixon, "Invalid contracts, estoppel and constructive trUSts" (2005) COfl/I 247. 
84 See Cobbe v ) toHlal/j Row MaflagrHl(flf Ltd r2OO51 EWHC 266, at p. 165. 
85 Sec )'axlry v Goffs r2oo21 Ch 162: Kif/(Ille v Knck.ie-Coflleh [2005] EWCA Civ 45. 
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the invalid contract but rather seeks to satisfy the equity.86 McFarlane, in an article published 
before the delivery of the House of Lords' decision in Yeomans Row Management Ud v 
Cobbe,87 noted that the courts have reacted ro this limiration of the doctrine by taking a very 
lenient approach to the establishment of a constrllctive trust.88 
The recent House of Lords' decision in Yeomans Rnw Management Ud v Cobbe89 creates 
the most serious impediments for informal purchasers seeking a remedy under the rubric of 
propriety estoppel. An oral agreement in principle had been reached that the defendant 
would sell the claimant a property and, in rerum, the claimant undertook to obtain planning 
permission and invested considerable time and money in doing so. When planning 
permission had been obtained, the defendant sought to withdraw from the agreement relying 
on non-compliance wid1 section 2 of the 1989 Act. Although Etherton J and the Court of 
Appeal awarded a remedy pursuant to the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, the House of 
Lords felt that they had stretched the boundaries of the doctrine too far90 and chose instead 
to provide a remedy in restirurion. The House of Lords ruled that, where an essential 
clement of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel could not be proved by the claimant, a 
ftnding of unconscionable behaviour on the part of the defendant was not sufftcient to 
warrant reliance on the doctrine. 91 Tf proof of the essential elements of the doctrine were 
not reguired, Lord Scott claimed "proprietary estoppel will lose contact with its roots and 
risk becoming unprincipled and therefore unpreclictable".92 The crucial difftculty for the 
claimant was that the oral agreement was incomplete which meant that he could not prove 
"an expectation of a certain interest in land".93 According to Lord Scotr, the claimant's 
expectation, which was encouraged by the defendant, was that upon the grant of planning 
permission there would be a successful negotiation of the outstanding terms of the contract 
for the sale of the property to him. At that point, a formal contract, which would include 
the already agreed core terms as weU as additional new terms, would be prepared and entered 
into. He concluded that an expectation dependent upon the conclusion of a successful 
negotiation is not an expectation of a sufftciendy certain interest in land.94 
Even if a complete agreement for the acquisition of an interest in land had been 
reached, Lord Scort stated obiterthat the doctrine cannot be relied on to render enforceable 
an agrcen:em that statute has declar~d to be void.95 Unlike constructive trusts, proprietary 
estoppel IS not expressly exempted from the provisions of section 2.96 Lord SCOtt's obiter 
comments make the doctrine's future role in the world of informal agrcements highly 
precarious, as two recent decisions of the Chancery Division of the High Court 
86 M Dixon, "Invalid contracts, e~toppel and constructive trusts" (2005) Conv247, at pp. 252-5; B McFarlane, 
"Proprietary estoppel and failed contracrual negotiations"(2005) COl/V 501, at pp. 516-21. 
87 P008] UKf-IL 55. 
88 See McFarlane. "Pmpriet.ary estoppel", n. 86 above. 
89 120081 UKHL 55. 
90 Ibid., at p~ra. 85 (per Lord Walker). 
91 Ibid., at paras 17 and 28. 
92 Ibid., at par~. 28. 
93 Ibid .. at para. 18-19. Lord Scott referred to the dicta of Oliver J in Tqylort Fashions Ltd v Lilf(rpool Victoria 
Tmstees Co Ltd [1982] QB 133, at p. 144, and Lord Kll1bt"Sdown in H.nHlsdM v Dyloll (1866) LR I HI.. 129, at 
p. 170, setting out this re'luiremcm. 
94 Ibid.,:H para. 18. 
95 l.ord Walker did not think it necessary or appropriate to comment on this isslie. See ibid., at para. 93. 
96 He was satisfied that the circumstances did not give rise ro a constsuctive trllst, as, unlike other joint venture 
cases where a constructive trust was imposed, th~ defendant owned the propert)' in '1uescion before they 
embarked on the tint venture. See ibid., at paras 30--6. 
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demonstrate. In Herberl v Doyle.?? the court distinguished the Cobbe case on the basis that 
the terms of the agreement being considered were complete. It ruled that, where aU the 
other requirements of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel are satisfied, a claim will nOt fail 
because it consists of an agreement which falls foul of section 2. The proper means of 
giving effect to the estoppel is to recognise or impose a constructive trust so that the 
remedy falls within the exception set out in section 2(5).98 In contrast, the court in 
Hulchif1SofJ v B fwd DF UmifetfJ9 endorsed Lord Scott's obiferview and rejected a proprietary 
estoppel claim where a complete oral agreement for the grant of a lease had been reached. 
In the Cobbe case, Lord Scott felt that it was unacceptable to excuse parties to an oral 
contract in relation to land from the statutoty formalities for such contracts, which they 
must have been aware of. On the other hand, Lord \'Valker's exposition of the law in the 
Cobbe case i.ndicates tolerance of the highest levels of naivety amongst claimants who are 
on the receiving end of gifts or testamentary dispositions which fail to comply with the 
relevant statutory formalities. lOO It is submitted that a remedy pursuant to the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel should be available to informal purchasers. as well as informal donees 
or successors, and although the commercial nature of the transaction may be an appropriate 
facmr to take intO account in considering whether the elements of the doctrine have been 
satis fied, it is an inadeCJuate basis for the decision to grant or withhold such a remedy. 
McFarlane, in his 2005 article, described how "the law recognises the practical reality that 
expectations can be generated in the absence of fmalised bargains and responds to the 
conseCJuenr need to provide redress to those who rely on such expcctations".101 In the 
aftermath of the Cobbe case, the potential withdrawal of this remedy from aU informal 
purchasers gives cause for grave concern and highlights the need to insert an express 
exception for proprietary estoppel in section 2 of the 1989 Act. 
The Law Commission, in its deliberations of when an adverse possession application 
should succeed in spite of an objection by the registered owner, assumes that a 
purchaser who paid the purchase price and went into possession pursuant to an oral 
contract for sale or a lease would succeed in obtaining a remedy under the doctrine of 
proprietary estOppel. I02 Recent caselaw highlights the danger of such an assumption and 
how easily the preferential treatment afforded by the Land Registration Act 2002 to such 
an informal purchaser who can also prove adverse possession for 10 years could become 
meaningless. Such an informal purchaser could be left in a legal limbo, unable to 
regula rise his or her position through proprietary esmppei or adverse possession and in 
cons tam danger of being evicted. 
Even if it is assumed that a purchaser under an invalid contract for sale would be 
entitled to be registered as owner on the basis of his o r her eCJuity by estoppel. the Law 
Commission also neglected to discuss, in any detail, the difficulties which such a purchaser 
may encouncer in proving adverse possession. Howevcir, it briefly acknowledged that in 
many cases where an equity arises by proprietary estoppel, the possession of the parry 
97 120081 EWHC 1950 (Ch) . 
98 Ibid., at paras 12-15. 
99 {2oo8J EWHC 2286 (Ch). at paras 64-70. 
100 Sec {2008] UKHL 55. :H para. 68. 
101 See McFarlane, "Proprletary estoppel". n. 86 above. at p. 515. 
102 In Ireland and Northern Ireland thiS purchaser u'Ould be able to seek an order for specific performance of 
his or her contract for sale as the doctnne of put performance, which renders ~n oral contract ~nforceablc. 
is still in force. lIo\\-"ever. if a concludcd contract for sale had not been reached, the Irish COUrlS rna\" aU'ard a 
remedy on the basis of proprietary estoppel, sec All Cumomi Ptf/, BoilbtlHltach Ttorenla v Albion ProperlltJ ud & 
Olhm [2oo8J I EHe 447. 
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asserting it will not have been adverse, because he or she will have been in possession of 
the land with the consen t of the registered proprietor. 103 Where the vendor represents to 
the purchaser that the purchaser may go into possession in spite of the absence of 
formalities, it may be difficult for the purchaser to argue subsequently that his or her 
possession was adverse. 104 The Law Commission envisaged that the condition set out in 
Schedule 6, paragraph 5(2), of the 2002 Act would cater for a purchaser who had paid the 
purchase price, gone into possession and treated the property as their own. Such actions 
may easily be construed as detrimental reliance, thus rendering the recovery of possession 
by the vendor improbable. The payment of the purchase price easily marks the moment at 
which the purchaser's possession becomes attributable to his or her equity and not the 
owner's permission. H owever, the Limitation Act 1980 fails to provide any guidance on 
whether time can run in favour of a person with an equity by es toppel. As was the case with 
a purchaser under an enforceable contract for sale, it is difficult to ascertain whether a right 
of action has accrued to the vendor and, if so, when tha t rigln accrued. 
Cltllen v Cflllen105 is the main authority for the proposition that a person, entitled to an 
equity by estoppel on the basis of a representation made by the owner, may in time 
extinguish the tide of that owner through adverse possession. I n that case, a son placed a 
portable house on his fa ther's land on the basis of an assurance given by his father to his 
mother that he did not mind. When the father tried co eject the son, Kenny J ruled that he 
could not go back on his assurance. Kenny J made his decision on the basis of the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel as he was of the opinion that the docaine of proprietary escoppel 
only applied in the case of a mistaken belief about the ownership of the land. 106 As a result, 
Kenny J thought tha t he did no t have jurisdiction CO order the father to transfer the sire ro 
the son, as promissory estoppel can only be used as a shield, not a sword. He noted, 
however, that once 12 years had passed, the son would be able to bring a successful adverse 
possession application to the Land Registry. I t is submitted that undue reliance may have 
been attached co Kenny)'s obiter comment. Kenny J clearly wished to make a positive order 
which would confer rights on the son in relation to the site but he was not sufficicndy 
comfortable with the principles of proprietary estoppel to avail of the extended jurisdiction 
which it permits. He must have felt com pelled co suggest a method by which the title could 
be regularised in the futu re. Although he stated that time began CO run when the son 
commenced building, he failed to clarify whether this was the point at which his possession 
ceased to be consensual and became attributable to his inchoate eguity. 
According co Walstead: 
Until the representor ancmpts to resile from the assumption engendercd by him, 
the representec has merely a permissive licence and will be unable to claim to be 
in adverse possession .. . Once the representor retracts the permissive licence a 
103 Law Comm No 254, 11.4 above, at para. 10.50, n. 162. 
104 A claimant who can establish an estoppel pursuant (0 the mistake limb of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
will find it much easier (0 prove adverse posses~ion as the circumstances are not complicated by a 
representation which could be construed as permission by the O\\<ller. The estoppel exception to the veto 
system introduced by [he 2002 Act may allow an applicant who made an initial mistake ill relation to the 
position of his or her boundaries bur canllOt prove good faith over the 10 years required by Seh 6, para. 5(4), 
to be registered as owner. The applicant must, however. be ill a position to prove that his or her neighbour 
aCCjuicsccd in the mistake. In contrast, an applicant who believed he or she \\·3S the owner of the boundary 
land throughout the IO-year period need not prove aCCjuiescellcc on (he part of a neighbour. 
lOS 11962]IR 268. 
106 Ibid .. ac pp. 291-2. J Mce discusses the development of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel in Irelalld in 
"Lost in the big house: where stands Irish law on e(luirablc estOppel" (1998) 23 lri!h juri!f ens) 187. 
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right of action. may accrue to him. At that time the rep resemce may be said to be 
in adverse possession as his licence has been replaced by an inchoate equity. l07 
Where the owner of registered freehold or leasehold land enters into an oral contract to sell 
that estate and the purchaser enters into possession in reliance on a representation made by 
the owner, it seems fair to assume that the purchaser's licence would be implicitly 
terminated once the entire purchase price was paid. At that point, the purchaser should also 
be in a position to demonstrate the animus possidendi essential in proving adverse possession. 
In such circumstances, the adjudicator would probably view the purchaser as entitled to be 
registered as the owner of the freehold or leasehold estate. However, if the registered owner 
entered into an agreement to grant a lease o r a sublease of the land, clearly the 
circumstances would preclude the registration of the purchaser as the proprietor of the 
entire registered es tate. The complications, discussed earlier, engendered by a frnding of 
adverse possession against a purchaser who holds pursuant to an enforceable agreement for 
a lease are avoided if the contract is unen fo rceable agd the circumstances give rise to an 
equity by estoppel. This is because the adjudicatot is specifically endowed with the 
discretion to order an appropriate remedy, which would clearly be an o rder for the grant of 
the agreed lease. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the reforms to the law on adverse possession introduced by the 2002 Act 
leave the informal purchaser in possession, who was intended to receive preferential 
treatment, in a precarious position. It is far from clear whether such a purchaser will be able 
to prove that his or her possession was adverse. It is submitted that the reforms should have 
been accompanied by legislative clarifica tion on when time begins to run against the vendor. 
Earlier, it was argued that a right of action should be deemed to accrue on the 
determination of the vendor's licence or the payment of the purchase price, whichever 
occurs earlier. It was also pointed out that the definition of a «purchaser" for the purposes 
o f such a deeming provision should exclude a person who has entered into an enforceable 
agreement for the grant of a lease. It would not be necessary to distinguish between 
contracts which comply with section 2 of the Law o f Properry (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1989 and those which do nOt in deeming when a right o f action accrues. However, a 
purchaser in possession pursuant to an oral contract for sale who wishes to make an adverse 
possession application faces the additional hurdle o f es tablishing the elements required by 
the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. In the aftermath of the Cobbe case, such a purchaser 
looks increasingly unlikely to succeed. To restore this remedy to purchasers it would be 
necessaty to insert a statutOry exception for proprietary estoppel into section 2 of the 1989 
Act. To conclude, although the Law Commission's imenrjon was to make the remedy of 
adverse possession available to informal purchasers, this intention is likely to be frustrated 
without the introduction of the legislative clarifications outlined in this article. 
107 M Walstead, "Proprietary estoppel :md the acquisition of po~sessor}' title" (1991 ) Conv 280. at p. 283 . 
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